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Topgolf Cuts Hundreds of Jobs After Ownership Change

Topgolf recently laid off hundreds of employees across its U.S. venues. These cuts impacted roles in sales, hospitality, operations, events, and customer experience. The layoffs occurred months after private equity firm Leonard Green acquired majority ownership. This action follows a previous round of 300 job cuts last year. New CEO David McKillips also replaced the company's top technology and marketing executives.

Dallas, Texas

https://www.dmagazine.com/micropost/top-golf-layoffs-may-2026/


Sycamore plans to double Walgreens profits.

Unfortunately the news article is paywalled. But how exactly do they plan to double profits? More cutbacks?? Is this the part where private equity starts doing what they do best, cut everything down to nothing to maximize profits?? Here is the link to the article but sorry it's paywalled.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-02/walgreens-private-equity-owner-plans-to-double-chain-s-profits


Walgreens Accelerates Restructuring as Sycamore Partners Intensifies Store Closures and Corporate Layoffs

In a move that underscores the continued volatility of the American retail pharmacy landscape, the newly private Walgreens Boots Alliance has announced a significant expansion of its workforce reductions and a finalized timeline for its massive store closure initiative. Under the leadership of the private equity firm Sycamore Partners, which completed a landmark $10 billion acquisition of the company in August 2025, Walgreens is slashing hundreds of additional corporate roles and shuttering a major distribution hub as it battles the systemic pressures that have already claimed several of its former peers.

https://markets.financialcontent.com/sandiego/article/marketminute-2026-2-23-walgreens-accelerates-restructuring-as-sycamore-partners-intensifies-store-closures-and-corporate-layoffs


Sycamore Partners Working Hard

Oh, well...

  • Walgreens is laying off 469 employees across multiple states following its acquisition by Sycamore Partners, adding to prior job cuts and store closures.
  • Since the buyout closed last August, Walgreens has reduced its footprint from about 8,500 stores and 220,000 employees to roughly 8,000 stores and 211,000 workers.
  • The Private Equity Stakeholder Project warned that earlier cost cutting steps, including holiday pay reductions, signaled deeper workforce reductions under private equity ownership.

Walgreens Cuts Hundreds of Jobs After Private Equity Acquisition

Walgreens is laying off hundreds of employees. These job cuts affect staff in Texas and Illinois. A WARN notice indicates 159 layoffs in Houston. An additional 469 positions are being eliminated in Illinois. These actions follow the company's acquisition by Sycamore Partners.
Houston, Texas

https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/walgreens-lay-hundreds-across-two-states


Avaya 2019-2023 Saga Chapter, In Review

This comment on another post [Post ID: @OP+1kh9rs9x2] is a very good factual summary. I like how the OG poster explained how/why/what/when that led to the Chapter 11 and going Private. Pretty stunned that, despite all the verifiable facts and SEC Filings that some people still believe (see comments) the Chapter 11 was a choice and that Alan Masarek had any other option available to him. Jim Chicago & Kieran McGrath were protected by the Chapter 11 Filing. If not, they would not have escaped criminal charges brought by the SEC (note -- different than civil suits they have escaped). Avaya would have liquidated without the chapter 11 due to the irregularities in the SEC filings.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++
August 9, 2022 SEC 12b-25
NOTIFICATION OF LATE FILING

"Furthermore, and separately [from the delayed 10-Q SEC Earnings Report Filing] the Audit Committee has also commenced an internal investigation to review matters related to a whistleblower letter that remains ongoing"

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1418100/000141810022000083/formnt10-q3q22.htm

Apollo and it's army of organizations that conspire to take over companies "stepped in" by creating an entrapment to force Alan Masarek's hand into allowing the Chapter 11 so they could steal equity and take Avaya private.

TIMELINE REMINDER

  1. The Subscription game-- which was a risky short-term strategy to falsely inflate the Market Valuation of Avaya so the greedy BoD and C-Suite could sell Avaya for north of $5b -- caught up to them and they had nowhere to hide in March 2022. Now IF they could book an enormous deal they could have extended the charade for another few quarters. That deal was to be Wells Fargo, if memory serves. So they delayed earnings in hopes to find an accounting workaround to explain away the unexplainable math that was the earnings reality. NOTE -- They spent since late 2019 fudging the numbers based on an algorithm of subscription-economy math that assumed a set value for each base client multiplied by market potential for signing the base clients to a subscription plan. THESE WERE NOT REAL #'s!!! For many quarters they could escape scrutiny b/c maintenance contracts were still collecting money. But when the first round of the 3 yr subscription deals were up, they were left with evaporated maintenance deals and accelerated client departures. It was one large empty hole.
    In May 2022, the situation hit severe crisis status. There was no explaining away the #s. They needed more than just one enormous deal. The Slippery Slope Subscription game was now a runaway train. The BoD knew they needed something extreme to buy time to avoid being exposed for the 3.5 yr con-game of pretending that the marketing soundbytes of the "subscription economy" translated into real revenue. They initiated the age-old strategy of the CEO-Shuffle and began an aggressive search to name a new CEO before they had to face yet another SEC filing delay. They begin talks with Masarek in May. Hire him in June. Announce him in July. Masarek is up for the challenge and confident he can stabilize Avaya by December .....HOWEVER

  2. Apollo Global deploys a leveraged lending takeover plan. It was an unofficial hostile takeover. They are able to secure some of the leveraged lending related to Avaya loans, yet not enough to execute a hostile takeover. So they instead devise a plan to make things so uncomfortable for Avaya leadership that they will just give in. They deploy their go-to auditing firms and dirty PR spin-doctors to both a) find dirt on Avaya to use as leverage; and b) entrap Avaya via auditing. This included names like Alix Partners.

  3. August 2022 -- Internal Audit discloses that Avaya lacked Internal Controls due to a broken process of formally investigating Ethics and Corporate Compliance reports. One example was a "Whistleblower" which filed a formal complaint months (maybe even a year) prior questioning accounting documentation of subscription deals and the risk to the overall business. At the time of the report, it was Shefali Shah's responsibility to ensure the complaint was properly and formally investigated. Instead, it was never even pursued. The independent auditing firm identified the breach of protocol that must be followed by any publicly traded company. Therefore, they were obligated by law to report the breach of protocol to the SEC in their next "we still can't file earnings" extension filing. This is called an "ICFR Weakness
    November 28, 2022 SEC FORM 8-K Avaya Admits to Lack of Internal Controls based on result of investigation. This essentially states that they violated SEC Rules by not pursuing the whistleblower complaint, however stops short that the complaint itself qualified as a whistleblower concern. "The deficiencies in internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) represented “material weaknesses,” the cloud technology company said in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
    Avaya discloses ICFR weaknesses linked to whistleblower logs Compliance Week

https://www.complianceweek.com/accounting-and-auditing/avaya-discloses-icfr-weaknesses-linked-to-whistleblower-logs/32407.article

  1. DECEMBER 2022 Apollo now believes they have Avaya cornered to give in to a Chapter 11 so they could go private and Apollo can deploy their tried and true law firms to manage the filing in their favor. Yet Alan Masarek was not giving in. So Apollo spent December 2022 maneuvering to force AMs hands. The end result of paying AM $10m ($6 m retention bonus so he would stay despite looming bankruptcy & $4m of his original sign-on bonus that he was required to use to buy Avaya shares. They waived that requirement and he was allowed to keep the money as cash. They also awarded Shefali Shah $1.2m as they needed her to help them go after Jim Chirico if that was necessary.

Avaya CEO To Get $6 Million Cash Award As Potential Bankruptcy Looms https://www.channelfutures.com/regulation-compliance/avaya-ceo-to-get-6-million-cash-award-stock-falls-below-nyse-minimum

SO @ab IS SPOT IN. THE WHISTLEBLOWER WAS REAL. IT WAS THE Everything. without that Whistleblower report Internal Controls Snafu, Apollo wouldn't have had the chance to deploy their gremlins to force AM into a takeover (also known as conspired Chapter 11).


Sycamore Tricks...don't be a fool and fall for it

Store Manager/RXM bonus this year is 75% based on "company numbers" that this private company controls and self reports.

Only 25% of the bonus is based on your store or pharmacy.

Do you trust Sycamore?

Have they been transparent and trustworthy?

Their #1 goal is IPO and staging the numbers for the underwriters that determine their IPO value.

Low expenses and cutting payroll helps them accomplish their goal.


LP still a good idea?

Anyone else have doubt about investing in LP in 2027? I’ve been looking forward to it but now I’m not sure I’m comfortable putting my money in.

How do I know it won’t be wasted or used to further compensate already wealthy GPs? LP has worked out great for associates in the past but part of me thinks it’s a trap.


Finally…! Hitachi to sell Hitachi Vantara and it’s storage business!

https://news.bloomberglaw.com/private-equity/hitachi-is-said-to-seek-buyer-for-1-3-billion-data-storage-unit

After a decade of mismanagement, Hitachi Vantara will seize to exist. From Brian Householder, Gajen Kandiah, to Sheila Rohra and her buddy Octavian, a string of incompetent leaders have eroded the company to a tired, irrelevant, skeleton with employees waiting for their turn at the chopping block.

Question is who will be interested in a dying business with small margins… Private equity? Broadcom? The other verdors will certainly want to spend their acquisition budget elsewhere. And without the Hitachi name, who will be interested in just Vantara? And for what? Their fabulous storage products, enterprise address book?

The recent round of layoffs and integration of ITPro make sense all of a sudden! It’s very sad for the employees though…

The Titanic is finally going under and will fall to pieces below the surface. Bye, bye, Vantara!


Idea into Sycamore's plan with Boots, Care, and shield?

So with Boots being the biggest money maker for them, I heard rumors that they were going to maybe IPO Boots? What do you think (hypothetically) the plan would be for the other two? Since these 3 would be where Sycamore can extract value from, I assume Walgreens would be fattened with debt and left to be gutted? Unless they have any aspiration of trying to save it.......

What do you guys think? Trying to understand how a PE would try to extract value with this deal.


700 Laid Off

Dun & Bradstreet terminated more than 700 people today, 1/27/2026. They eliminated jobs across all US based business units, all titles, all the way up to SVP.

They have consolidated sales teams and instituted double digit growth goals even though they grew at low single digits in 2025.

Private equity takeover ruins everything and always eliminated jobs.


LAYOFFS: Jeppesen ForeFlight (Boeing's Digital Aviation Solutions business)

Thoma Bravo Acquisition Leads to Jeppesen ForeFlight Layoffs

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2026-01-15/private-equity-buy-leads-layoffs-jepp-foreflight

Jeppesen ForeFlight employees recently experienced layoffs. This followed private-equity firm Thoma Bravo's acquisition of Boeing's Digital Aviation Solutions business. Boeing sold the business for $10.55 billion last November. Initial social media claims of 40-50% layoffs were deemed overstated by the company. Jeppesen ForeFlight stated these changes streamline operations and support product innovation.


Sapiens begins global layoffs as new owner Advent reshapes the company

The software company is laying off about 10% of its global workforce following its $2.5 billion acquisition by Advent. The cuts in Israel will be relatively modest, around 5%, while layoffs in India and the US will reach about 10% of employees.

https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/bybo6fzbbl


Leave or always be ready, protect yourself.

This is coming from your friends across the highway in Deerfield (for now) at Essendant. Sycamore will destroy Walgreens and it will be torture before death. Watch out for yourself, try to get out, don't wait around for things to get better or any claims of severance payouts or bonuses. If not be ready for that day to happen at any moment. Don't get comfortable. This is just the beginning, they are not out for the best interests of the company or employees but rather their assets and any money they can su-k away. For a little context, at Essendant, they bought in their own management to play the game from the top. You have them now. First they need to get rid of employees so they would try to make people quit, RTO, unachievable goals, confusing business model/plans. Then they would change the severance policy, usually days before the layoffs and reduce it every time until there's nothing left. They will start selling off anything they can, in our case the core of the business, the warehouses, and business units they could get money for they sold. They sold off the core of the business, and all that remains is the empty shell of what once was a fortune 500 company. Always with the narrative it was low performing or best for the business. The top people will leave, they will torture anyone willing to stay on because they know they are desperate until the end. It might not have been great before, but it's surely not going to get any better. Also, it appears we will be abandoning Deerfield at the end of 2025 (in days), leaving the lease for the HQ building, with no plans on what will happen next. Bankruptcy maybe? Our parent company Staples is just holding on as well, and Quill also nearby saw their whole company be destroyed. All the other Sycamore holdings are also just barely existing just to keep those assets on a balance sheet so they can convince investors to move onto the next victim. Walgreens is and will be nothing more than a cash grab and a way to pad their holdings. There is no long term strategy, no business plan, and everything will just be scam. Just look at the partnerships with Amazon for their other businesses. It's all a distraction, and minor income, distracting from what is really happening. Wish you well and in closing, please care for yourself, find something else, f*** the PE.


We should be ready for bad outcomes

Ending up in PE hands would probably mean a bloodbath. Private equity is almost always focused on extracting value first, which, of course, means massive cuts. Not that we aren’t trained by experience to expect the worst, but this would be a major threat to most of our jobs.


Walgreens Will Fall

This company is going to collapse, and you need to prepare yourself for that. I left many years ago because I saw the writing on the wall. The recent sale to private equity will not save the company; it's the final death knell. Let me tell you a little story:

I worked for Walgreens in the Pharmacy from 2005 until 2013. I enjoyed the work so much that I started to pursue a PharmD. The work was always grueling, and we were always strapped for time, even in the beginning. I remember working double shifts during hurricanes and eating on the back counter often because we didn't have time to take breaks. I've heard the pharmacy actually shuts down now for lunch...must be nice.

At any rate, from the time I started until the time I left, our budget was continuously reduced. We were asked to do more with less, and it wasn't just us who suffered, it was the customer experience as well. These are operational changes meant to increase margins or protect existing margins, but they are not strategic choices. The reason they were necessary at all is due to strategic missteps, but what were they?

Here it is, from this single strategic error, all subsequent failures originate: Walgreens as a company failed to see the entire market shifting beneath its feet. Their strategy was based on the following model: expand stores, expand sales per store, reduce costs, and reward shareholders. The company was, and still is, optimized for operational efficiency. This model was fundamentally obsolete the moment that CVS and Caremark merged to create a fully integrated pharmacy services provider.

They failed to realize that the number of stores or operational excellence is meaningless in an environment where the PBMs are now the locus of control. The PBMs control the formularies, and hence, demand. They set reimbursement rates, and hence, margin. The number of stores isn't an advantage in this environment. If anything, it's a vulnerability.

The most egregious part of all this, is that it was entirely predictable. It didn't happen overnight. Instead of shifting their strategy and trying to acquire their own PBM, WAG sold theirs off. Then in 2011, they tried to play chicken with Express Scripts, and again they were critically mistaken. The number of stores is not equivalent to bargaining power. They lost that fight, and were forced into a worse agreement because of it. From then on, they lost negotiating power permanently, and all other negotiations would be from a weakened position.

Were that not enough, they bought Boots in 2014, which again doesn't solve the issue of vertical integration. They were still operating under the assumption that expanding the footprint would lead to better profits.

In an act of desperation, they invested in Theranos, and I think we all know how that went.

So where did that lead them?

To the following negative feedback loop:

lower reimbursement -> lower margin

lower margin -> labor and store cuts

labor and store cuts -> worse customer experience

worse customer experience -> lower foot traffic

lower foot traffic -> lower sales and even weaker negotiating position

This loop will not stop, and it will not be broken by Private Equity. Those are the only tools private equity really has. They can make operational changes. They cannot solve the strategic failure. They cannot suddenly negotiate better deals with the PBMs without leverage. They cannot reverse the regulatory framework that allowed this level of vertical integration to happen. They cannot afford to vertically integrate themselves, and there are no PBMs that would be a viable target even if they could.

So, where does all that leave us? There is only one inevitable conclusion: bankruptcy.

I saw this coming and left. I ask you, do you trust the leadership that allowed the company to reach this state from a position of strength, to be able to turn it around from a position of weakness? They made countless strategic errors. Do you trust your career with them?


How we got to now

I see posts on here all the time lamenting PE ownership, made without any understanding of how we got to this point, and how this goes all the way back to asinine decisions pre-bankruptcy in 2013. I’ve decided to play Cengage historian and lay some of this out for posterity, and so I can yell at the sky

2012–2013: Debt pile gets ugly
• Pre-bankruptcy: Before Chapter 11, Cengage was already doing financial engineering just to push out maturities — e.g., in 2012 it sold $725M of 11.5% senior secured notes due 2020 and amended its credit facilities to extend term loan and revolver maturities.
• July 2, 2013: Cengage files for Chapter 11 with about $5.8B of outstanding debt, announcing a “pre-arranged” restructuring to eliminate more than $4B of that.
Even before bankruptcy, they were in the classic LBO textbook-publisher trap: lots of high-coupon debt, some of it maturing in big lumps, and a business that’s not exactly a rocket ship.

2014: Emerges from Chapter 11… still leveraged
• April 1, 2014: Cengage officially emerges from Chapter 11. The plan cuts ~$4B of funded debt and brings in $1.75B of new Term Loan B financing, plus a $250M asset-based revolver, as exit financing.
• Post-reorg, they’re no longer at $5.8B of debt, but they do still have roughly ~$1.8–2B of funded debt sitting above a business doing around ~$2B of revenue at the time, still pretty leveraged.

That Term Loan B is key. By design, those loans usually have tiny quarterly amortization and then a big “bullet” (lump-sum) repayment at maturity. You drag a big principal balance for years, paying interest the whole time, then face a huge refinancing/repayment cliff at the end.

2014–2019: Term loan era, dividend recaps, and financial engineering
• In the years after emergence, Cengage spends a lot of time tweaking the capital structure: repricing the term loan, issuing additional term debt, and even doing share-repurchase and dividend recap transactions (they literally disclosed a “dividend recapitalization” in FY2015 current reports).
• if you’re still doing buybacks / dividends and refinancing loans rather than aggressively paying them down, you’re implicitly betting that refinancing the big bullet at the end of the term will be doable when you get there.
So by late 2010s you’ve got a company that did cut its original $5.8B anchor, but is still sitting on a large secured term loan and reliant on capital markets to roll that over when maturities and balloon payments come due.

2019–2020: Aborted McGraw-Hill merger, more uncertainty
• In 2019 Cengage announces a planned merger with McGraw-Hill and a related amendment to its senior secured credit facilities, again, capital structure is clearly front-and-center.
• The merger is ultimately called off in 2020 after regulatory issues, which leaves Cengage still independent, still carrying its own debt stack, and now without the scale/merger synergies that were supposed to help.
So by early 2020s, you’ve got: meaningful secured debt, a term-loan structure with big future maturities, and no merger “escape hatch.”

2021–2022: Rising rates + debt drag
• For FY22 (year ended March 31, 2022), Cengage reports adjusted cash revenue of about $1.37B and Adjusted Cash EBITDA less prepub of ~$326M.
• That’s a decent EBITDA number, but on top of a large term loan it still implies a non-trivial leverage ratio. As global rates move up and credit spreads widen (2022–2023), the cost of keeping that debt financed goes up, and the risk of refinancing a big bullet at attractive rates gets worse.
The company itself starts talking more about “financial flexibility” and de-leveraging in investor materials around this time… they know the balance sheet is constraining what they can do.

April 2023: Apollo preferred equity to prevent collapse
• April 17, 2023: Cengage announces that Apollo Funds will invest $500M into a new series of convertible preferred stock
• In the press release, Cengage explicitly says it will use the proceeds to “reduce outstanding debt and lower interest expense,” and to “increase financial flexibility” to invest in growth.
The old LBO-style debt and its balloon risk were getting harder and more expensive to carry in a higher-rate world. Rather than wait for a ugly refinancing fight when the big maturities hit, they sold a chunk of the company to Apollo via preferred equity, then used that cash to pay down loans and push the maturity wall further out.

2023–2025: PE priorities, “efficiency,” and repeated layoffs
Once Apollo is in, the priorities shift to the usual PE playbook:
• Sharpen the focus on EBITDA, cash flow and “portfolio mix
• Cuts, cuts, cuts

A classic pattern of a ZombieCo:

  1. Heavy term-loan/balloon-style post-bankruptcy debt +
  2. Rising interest rates and a tougher refi environment
  3. Need to de-risk the maturity wall with Apollo preferred equity
  4. Apollo-style mandate to improve profitability and reallocate capital
  5. Repeated restructuring and headcount reductions

VERIZON Phase 2

Phase 2: The Premium IPO (Years 3-5)
The endgame is not a utility sale. A rebranded "Tech-Enabled Communications Platform" targets 10-11x EV/EBITDA—more than double VZ’s current segment multiple—by shifting the investor narrative from "low-growth utility" to "digitally enabled service platform."

MetricLegacy VZ SegmentModeled ServCo (Year 5)EBITDA Margin25%38%EV/EBITDA Multiple5-6x10-11xWhy Verizon is the Perfect Case Study

CEO Dan Schulman's track record—scaling PayPal’s asset-light model—aligns perfectly with a ServCo mindset. Separation would allow him to:
Shed Valuation Drag: Instantly move ~$20B in annual CapEx off the P&L.
Focus on Growth: Reinvest freed capital into service innovation and customer experience.

Enhance Transparency: Attract differentiated, growth-focused funds for ServCo and stable income funds for NetCo.

The Precedent is Clear: BT/Openreach, Telstra InfraCo, and KKR/Telecom Italia have already demonstrated double-digit valuation re-ratings once infrastructure and services were properly delineated.

The ServCo, long viewed as the weaker half, could become the crown jewel—reborn as a high-margin, digitally transformed growth vehicle commanding a premium Wall Street multiple.

This isn't financial engineering; it's the structural precondition for sustainable growth. The sum of the parts is clearly worth more than the whole.
hashtag#Telecom hashtag#Verizon hashtag#PrivateEquity hashtag#Valuation hashtag#ApolloGlobalManagement hashtag#Strategy hashtag#StructuralSeparation
likelovesupport


VERIZON Phase 1

The Only Way to Fix Verizon's Valuation: Apollo's Blueprint for Structural Separation

Probably 12000 FTEs will loose their jobs. (this already happened !!!)

The days of the integrated telecom giant are over. The biggest opportunity in the sector today isn't a new product; it's a structural divorce—separating the capital-intensive NetCo (Network) from the asset-light, growth-driven ServCo (Service).

This is no longer a fringe idea; it's the defining transformation trend of the decade, and it’s the most rational path to unlock billions in trapped equity value—especially for a stock like Verizon ($VZ).

The Problem: Blended Multiples Suppress Value
Integrated carriers suffer from a blended market multiple problem. The network's capital drag suppresses returns, while the dynamic service business is undervalued. The result? Chronically low P/E ratios and stagnant shares despite strong cash generation.
The Solution: Apollo’s Reverse LBO ServCo Play
Private Equity firms like Apollo Global Management are experts at complex carve-outs. Their blueprint for a newly-separated ServCo: a Reverse LBO that transforms a utility stock into a premium tech-enabled platform, commanding a 2x multiple expansion.

Phase 1: The Asset-Light Transformation (Years 1-2)
Digital-First Cost Structure: Replacing legacy IT with cloud-native BSS/OSS and using AI to overhaul customer service, driving a 20-30% OpEx reduction.
Pure-Play Aggregation: ServCo pivots entirely to the customer, bundling connectivity with high-margin services (security, streaming, IoT). Result: 5-10% ARPU increase and up to 25% churn reduction.

Deleveraging: Cost savings are rapidly converted into financial firepower to stabilize the balance sheet.

What are your thoughts ?
Light Reading Fierce Network
hashtag#Telecom hashtag#Verizon hashtag#PrivateEquity hashtag#Valuation hashtag#ApolloGlobalManagement hashtag#Strategy hashtag#StructuralSeparation


Couchbase laying off 11 in Austin after the California firm's recent merger

A California-based data company is trimming nearly a dozen Travis County positions after it was acquired recently by an Austin private equity firm.

Couchbase Inc. is eliminating 11 of an estimated 40 positions at the company’s Austin offices at 9050 N. Capital of Texas Highway, according to a notice filed with the Texas Workforce Commission. Most of the employees affected are part of the company’s sales and corporate teams.

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/couchbase-laying-off-11-austin-190418814.html