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NkE Market Cap Shrinks to 1/5 its Value in 5 Years

Nike Inc
NYSE: NKE
42.38 USD -117.37 (-73.47%) past 5 years
Jul 1, 1:11 PM EST

The USD in real terms is 24.3% less valuable in that same 5 year period, which means NKE market cap has collapsed to less than 1/5 its value 5 years ago.

"Believe in Something, Even if it Means Sacrificing Errr-Thang!"


BNY - to serve mankind

In 2023, BNYM had 53,400 FT employees. In the annual report for 2025, there were 48,100 FT employees. Today there are 47,200 and dropping. That’s $1B in cash cuts being counted as profit!!! BNY is hiding poor negative cash flow without truly running and growing the business!!!!! BNY has reduced headcount 12% in 3 years and AI has had nothing to do with it. It’s easy to say your BMI is lower if you cut off a leg. It however doesn’t mean you are able and healthy. Of the 6200 FTE’s who have been consumed by Robin’s ‘cannibits’ , you can be assured that a very high percentage of these were so called bottom performers…..
Yes, RV’s strategy is the ‘serve mankind cookbook’ from the ‘Twilight Zone’.


DXC - a company in decline

Here’s the full picture. The data is sobering.


## DXC Technology: Market Analysis

### Stock Price — 5-Year Collapse

The trajectory is consistent destruction of value: from a 2018 average of ~$80 (peak $93), the stock fell 35% that year, another 28% in 2019, another 30% in 2020. A brief recovery of 25% in 2021 was the last positive year.

From there: -17.7% in 2022, -13.7% in 2023. Into 2024 it was trading around $22–23. The 52-week high was $16.45 in July 2025 — already half of where it was in 2023. The 52-week low hit $7.90 in May 2026. YTD return as of mid-2026: -43.89%.

From $93 peak to ~$8–9 today. That is roughly a 90% destruction of equity value over 8 years.

The consensus from 8 analysts is “Hold.” Average price target: $11.43. BMO Capital lowered its target to $10 from $17, keeping Market Perform. Nobody is bullish. “Hold” at $8–9 is essentially “we don’t know how much further this falls.”


### Revenue — Uninterrupted Decline

Annual revenue of approximately $13.7 billion in FY2024, a decline of over two billion dollars from FY2022.

FY2025 came in at $12.87 billion, down 5.82%. Revenue in the last twelve months (to December 2025) is $12.68 billion, down 3.09% year-over-year.

The most recent quarter: Q4 FY2026 total revenue of $3.13 billion, down 1.2% year-over-year on a reported basis — but down 6.6% on an organic basis. The nominal improvement in reported numbers is forex noise, not operational recovery.

The full organic picture over FY2025: Q1: -4.4%, Q2: -5.6%, Q3: -4.2%, Q4: -4.2%. Full year organic decline: -4.6%. The GIS segment is worse: GIS organic revenue growth across FY2025 was Q1: -9.3%, Q2: -9.6%, Q3: -7.8%, Q4: -6.0% — full year -8.2%.

This is not a one-quarter blip. It is a structural, multi-year revenue haemorrhage.


### “No New Business” — The Book-to-Bill Problem

This is the core issue you’ve identified. In Q1 FY2025, the book-to-bill ratio was 0.77x — compared to 0.89x in Q1 FY2024. A book-to-bill below 1.0 means the company is booking less revenue than it is recognising — i.e., the backlog is shrinking. Consistently below 1.0 is a company consuming itself.

Q2 FY2025 overall book-to-bill: 0.90x. GIS specifically: 0.71x. GIS — their largest segment — was winning less than 71 cents of new work for every dollar of revenue recognised. That is accelerated decline built into future numbers.

The more recent figures look marginally better: Q2 FY2026 trailing twelve-month book-to-bill: 1.15x, with GIS at 1.08x on TTM basis. But context matters — Q4 FY2026 bookings gave a book-to-bill of 1.07x , and organic revenue still fell 6.6% that quarter. Booking more doesn’t reverse the run-off from long-term contracts signed years ago that are now expiring or being reduced.

DXC has made zero acquisitions since November 2019. Over the last five years, the average number of acquisitions per year is zero. There is no inorganic growth play. They are entirely dependent on winning organic new business — which they have been structurally failing to do for years.


### Profitability and Cash — The Complicating Factor

DXC is not going to zero next quarter. Full fiscal year 2026 free cash flow was $713 million, up 3.8% year-over-year. The company repurchased $250 million of shares in FY2026.

Gross margin remained relatively stable at 24.09%, and adjusted EBIT margins are being maintained.

But: GAAP EBIT in Q4 FY2026 was negative — $(39) million, a margin of -1.2%. The gap between non-GAAP “adjusted” figures and GAAP reality has been persistently large due to restructuring charges, amortisation, and pension adjustments. The company has been in near-permanent “restructuring” mode for years.

ROIC is below WACC. The company is destroying economic value — it is worth less each year as an operating entity than the capital tied up in it.


### Can It Survive?

Survival as a listed independent company: questionable beyond 3–5 years without a revenue inflection that has not yet materialised.

The structural problem is this: DXC is a legacy IT outsourcer. Its model — large long-term managed services contracts, rates × hours pricing — is being eroded by cloud migration (clients bring workloads in-house or to hyperscalers), offshore competition (TCS, Infosys, Wipro at lower cost), and now AI automation eating into the billable hour. The CEO acknowledges this directly: “The era of rates times hours is ending.” True. The question is whether DXC can pivot to something else before the existing base runs off.

FY2027 guidance anticipates further revenue decline but margin stability, with AI-driven offerings cited as future support. Every IT services company is saying the same thing about AI. DXC is late to that narrative and has no obvious differentiation.

The most likely exit is acquisition. There have been renewed reports of private equity interest, and in late 2022 a Baring Private Equity Asia takeover was rumoured but fell through. At ~$4.1 billion market cap generating $700M+ of free cash flow annually, the FCF yield is enormous — it is obviously a PE target. The asset would be stripped, carved up, and the cash flow harvested while the workforce is cut.

A shareholder lawsuit investigation was launched in June 2026 , which adds legal distraction at a strategically vulnerable moment.


### Summary Assessment

Dimension Verdict
Stock price (5-year) -90% from peak, -44% YTD 2026
Revenue trend Organic decline ~4–9% every year since FY2020
New business Book-to-bill mostly <1.0 for years; recent marginal improvement
Inorganic growth Zero acquisitions since 2019
Cash generation Strong (~$700M FCF) — the one positive
Economic value creation Negative — ROIC below WACC
Competitive position Structural moat deterioration, no durable advantage
Survival as independent Uncertain — more likely PE acquisition than organic recovery

The cash generation is real and buys time. It also makes the company attractive to a buyer who can cut costs more aggressively than management has been willing to. The narrative around AI and “Xponential AI” and “OASIS” is exactly what a company in distress says. What matters is whether bookings translate into arrested revenue decline — and the gap between book-to-bill improving and organic revenue still falling 6.6% in Q4 FY2026 tells you there is a significant lag at best, a structural impossibility at worst.

The company is not dying this year. It is in managed, prolonged decline, and the probability of meaningful independent recovery is low.

Confidence: High on the factual picture; moderate on the 3–5 year outcome (acquisition vs. slow suffocation are both plausible; a genuine revenue turnaround is the low-probability scenario).


Summary of Losses: Neidorff vs. London

Era – Michael Neidorff (1996–2022)
Peak Quarterly Performance: $535 million (Q2 2021)
Annual Performance: Maintained profitability
Main Drivers: Pharmacy benefit manager legal settlements; COVID-19 utilization spikes

Era – Sarah London (2022–Present)
Peak Quarterly Loss: $6.6 billion (Q3 2025)
Peak Annual Performance: $6.7 billion net loss (Full-Year 2025)
Main Drivers: Federal Medicaid funding cuts; asset write-downs

Why is Sara London still the face of this company if she has cost the company Billions??


MotU “now tracking to become one of biggest box office bombs of all time.”

I didn’t realize this film was doing so bad, but I just saw a report that say, two weeks after being released, the new He-Man movie is “now tracking to become one of biggest box office bombs of all time.” Is this a something we should be worried about?


OpenAI losing billions, and has to cut prices?

Thats gotta be a great sign huh? Losing billions, needing to cut prices, and pushing a desperate hail mary IPO.

If we are saving humanity and curing cancer, why are they cutting prices before even figuring out how to make a single penny in profit?

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DUu3O7YkxMO/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==


Summary of the layoff Cycle reported by AI

The multi-wave timeline clarifies the structural pattern Oracle follows:
August 31, 2025 Layoff: Accounted for as a $402 million localized surge in Q1 FY26 (reported September 2025).
March 31, 2026 Layoff: Accounted for as an $823 million localized surge in Q4 FY26 (reported yesterday, June 10, 2026).
The Result: The accumulation of these massive structural waves is what compiled the overall $2.1 billion restructuring footprint, leaving the remaining ~$980 million reserve sitting clean on the books to fund the upcoming FY2027 phases.


It's good to see that layoffs no longer equal a stock surge, but the opposite

SentinelOne shares plunged in after-hours trading on Wall Street after the company published its first-quarter financial results and announced layoffs affecting 8% of its workforce. The cybersecurity company reported results that largely met expectations but issued a relatively weak forecast, sending the stock sharply lower in late trading.

https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/r1goyeuxgx


Where's the accountability?

They always have an excuse on earnings calls. Covid, Presidential elections, war, gas prices, etc. When will analysts call their bluff? They’re so far off from paying off their debt. If they don’t do sell offs, they will continue to cut expenses (headcount) every quarter to make the numbers look better.

@e2+1kr1f5ck0 said it perfectly.


Snowflake Delivers +34% YoY

Snowflakes delivers a strong Q1.

Product revenue reached $1.33B, up 34% year-over-year, accelerating from 30% last quarter and 26% a year ago. Their strongest sequential dollar growth in company history.

They added 616 net new customers in the quarter (+38% YoY), and operating margin expanded over 300 basis points to 12%


StockStory is not impressed

Teradata (TDC)
Forward P/S Ratio: 1.9x

Why Do We Pass on TDC?

— Products, pricing, or go-to-market strategy may need some adjustments as its 3.7% average billings growth over the last year was weak

— Inability to adjust its cost structure while its revenue declined over the last year led to a 7.2 percentage point drop in the company’s operating margin

— Free cash flow margin is forecasted to shrink by 20.2 percentage points in the coming year, suggesting the company will consume more capital to keep up with its competitors.


VRP

Some people are suggesting / hoping that we'll get a VRP? Given the financial situation / stock value situation - what makes you think this may happen? I hope it will but everything I look at is so grim and I simply do not have any hope that a VRP may be in stars for us.


Capital Management is Struggling

Morningstar Percentile Rankings Through 5/23.

Fund Name Percentile Rank
MoA Intermediate Bond Fund 98
MoA Retirement Income Fund 94
MoA Clear Passage 2020 Fund 93
MoA Core Bond Fund 90
MoA Clear Passage 2050 Fund 85
MoA Clear Passage 2055 Fund 85
MoA Clear Passage 2060 Fund 84
MoA Clear Passage 2045 Fund 83
MoA Clear Passage 2070 Fund 83
MoA Clear Passage 2065 Fund 81
MoA Mid Cap Value Fund 80
MoA Clear Passage 2040 Fund 79
MoA Clear Passage 2035 Fund 77
MoA Clear Passage 2030 Fund 76
MoA Clear Passage 2025 Fund 75
MoA International Fund 74
MoA Conservative Allocation Fund67
MoA Mid Cap Growth Fund 62
MoA Catholic Values Index Fund 56
MoA Small Cap Value Fund 55
MoA Moderate Allocation Fund 54
MoA Aggressive Allocation Fund 52
MoA Balanced Fund 49
MoA Small Cap Equity Index Fund 45
MoA Mid Cap Equity Index Fund 38

The higher the percentile rank, the worse the performance. MOA funds have tanked. how is overpaid capital mismanagement going to spin this

time to sell Capital Management to raise revenue & get better returns


Intuit Announces Workforce Reduction, Reports Solid Earnings

Intuit exceeded financial estimates for its third quarter. The company announced a significant reduction in its employee count. The CEO said artificial intelligence did not cause the layoffs. The reason was to create a more agile and efficient organization. The company increased its financial outlook for fiscal 2026.

https://www.barrons.com/articles/intuit-earnings-stock-price-layoffs-a96cfca9


More for Him, Less for Everyone Else: Five Years of Waters Corporation

Since Udit Batra took over as President and CEO of Waters Corporation in September 2020, his total compensation has risen approximately 146% - from $5.7 million in his first partial year to $14 million in 2025 - while the company’s financial performance has largely stagnated. Revenue grew modestly from $2.37 billion in 2020 to $2.96 billion in 2024, a rise of around 25%, and net income actually declined from its 2022 peak of $708 million to $638 million in 2024. The most glaring disconnect came in 2023–2024, when earnings were flat to negative yet Batra received a 27.6% pay increase. Over the same period, the company’s workforce has shrunk. After growing to a peak of 8,200 employees in 2022, Waters cut roughly 328 jobs in a formal 2023 layoff round - approximately 4% of global headcount - and has continued to shed staff, ending 2024 at 7,600 employees, a net reduction of around 700 from the peak and below where the company stood when Batra arrived. Batra himself has cited the headcount reductions as a management success, pointing to flatter org structures and tighter spans of control, while employee reviews describe a culture of ongoing layoffs, increased workloads, suppressed pay, and leadership disconnected from the workforce. In sum, Waters under Batra presents a picture of a CEO whose compensation has substantially outpaced both the company’s financial results and the fortunes of its employees.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​


BILL Holdings Announces Layoffs and Share Buyback Amid Q3 Growth

BILL Holdings, Inc. reported solid financial results for its third fiscal quarter. Total revenue reached $406.6 million, a 13% increase year-over-year. The company also announced a major restructuring plan to reduce its workforce by up to 30%. This restructuring is expected to incur $30 million to $60 million in charges. Concurrently, the board authorized a new $1.0 billion share repurchase program.

San Jose, California

https://www.stocktitan.net/sec-filings/BILL/8-k-bill-holdings-inc-reports-material-event-a30cd671905e.html


Summuray of how $hit DXC execs are

DXC traded around $59 per share in 2017 and spiked to $96 per share in 2018. But since then, save for a surge during the 2021 tech bo-m, it has been a long, slow decline. On April 30, it closed at an all-time low of $11.32 per share -- that is since it went public as DXC in 2017.

On an average annualized basis, DXC stock has dropped 17.7% per year over the past nine years.


2026 Q1 Earnings cited by investors as "sign of poor business quality"

"Teradata struggled to consistently generate demand over the last five years as its sales dropped at a 2.3% annual rate. This was below our standards and is a sign of poor business quality."

https://www.financialcontent.com/article/stockstory-2026-5-5-teradata-nysetdc-posts-better-than-expected-sales-in-q1-cy2026


LAHSA Layoffs Follow Audit of Financial Controls

The Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority released delayed audit findings. These findings identified significant weaknesses in its financial internal controls. LAHSA subsequently issued layoff notices to certain employees. Los Angeles County is redirecting funding for greater accountability. Supervisor Horvath stated structural change was necessary due to a lack of transparency.

Los Angeles, California

https://www.smdp.com/supervisor-horvath-seiu-local-721-respond-to-lahsa-layoff-notices/


Q1

This business of calling prior year LEX results growth is massive BS.

Q1 2026

Revenue of $1.85 billion, up 26.7 percent, or 23.6 percent in constant currency1. On a pro forma2 basis, revenue is down 3.7 percent.
GAAP net (loss) of $(105) million, or $(0.84) per share, down $15 million or $0.09 per share, year-over-year, respectively.
Normalized Adjusted3 net (loss) of $(10) million, or $(0.11) per share, down $3 million or $0.02 per share, year-over-year, respectively.
Adjusted1 net (loss) of $(51) million, or $(0.43) per share, down $47 million or $0.37 per share, year-over-year, respectively.
Adjusted1 operating income of $72 million, up $50 million year-over-year.
Adjusted1 operating margin of 3.9 percent, up 240 basis points year-over-year.
Operating cash flow of $(144) million, down $55 million year-over year, reflecting expected Q1 seasonality.
Free cash flow1 of $(165) million, down $56 million year-over-year. Full-year free cash flow guidance of approximately $250 million is unchanged, implying greater than $400 million of cash generation over the remaining three quarters.