NGDM had many names and they usually all started with "No good...". In fact, Senior management had their own too caused by the headaches it caused them.
It was introduced to CSC via a digital PDF paper that had been drafted by McKinsey who were looking to find a big blue-chip to sell it too, with the pretense that it had been successful 'in lots of other industries'. Mainly financial, where they also struggled with its lack of specification.
It was supposed to create a less silo'd and more holistic operating model for flexibility, reduced costs, improved accountability and all the other blah, blah, blah. The paper was sparcely documented back then. It was later glossied up into something of credibility, but not until 2017 by which time the ill-informed damage had been done. Half finished forms were given to CSC. They were actually sanitised versions from other customers. CSC didn't use these forms, preparing to use existing templates. Although a few they didn't understand were taken and CSC logos added, but never used.
No-one understood NGDM or POD. Indeed, the biggest argument at the time was whether it should be written Pod or POD and as it didn't stand for anything, it was decided to be written as Pod. They debate overtook all other strategic decision that needed to be made, but was symptomatic of the level of nonsense that was clouding the steering groups.So they ran a competition to give the model some cultural identify for everyone and came up with iBuild, iDon't; iWill; iWon't and of course the popular iWANTOUTTAHERE
CSC Management thought the model was a way of centralising and cutting costs, but completely missed the whole point. Lean, automation, agile, feedback loops. The foundation was never thought about, it was just a rush to form groups everywhere, like some mid-afternoon break out exercise.
Hilton got it, but kept a discrete distance. Thinking wasn't around DevOps or OODA; more 'Oh dear'
The teams were supposed to be autonomous, anchored in customer journeys, but many were lost.
Big customers who had initially warmed to the idea of NGDM - and had endured the pain of CSC powerpoints with those models smiling and shaking hands, promising cost-savings and skills 24x7 remotely from anywhere on the planet with an ethernet port - found stuff was not being fixed today, but the day after tomorrow. To the customer, CSC's 'follow-the-sun' service was more like some kid chasing a dog off down the beach and not coming back.
So NGDM responded with 'co-located centres'. Tah-Dah! These would keep the big clients happy and effectively put restore the model to how it felt before. The client was happier but kept an eye out. The smaller customers were not so lucky and continued to wait their turns in long queues.
"You are at queue position twenty six. Thank you for holding."
Those in CSC will recall how the mess of new centres opening one year and closing the next, like someone was playing cards at the big table. The operation started to slide downhill with deteriorating service, but more toably some disasters. Not all environmental, but they did show CSC's lack of preparedness and despite heroics from staff, the lack of management foresight was worrying.
The client objected to poor communications. Things can be bad, but as long as you inform them and what you are doing about it, they can be tolerant. But not to be told is unforgiveable.Poor governance, accountability; lack of early warning systems and constant labour and skill loss, meant that the NGDM had outgrown its usefullness and had become caked in layers of management who had all seen it as an easy escape ticket from account purges.
You could argue that from the whole sorry experience, that DXC has now learned its lesson and is better able to support its clients on their own digital journeys.
Maybe. But I wouldn't buy a used car of them.