Boeing has been poorly run for well over 25 years! Yes, 25 years! Everything is finally catching up due to 1). Continuous Poor Management, 2). Hiring unqualified people. 3). Nepotism 4). Good All Boy Philosophy, 5). Blatant Technical Arrogance, among many other things. I KNOW! I WORKED THERE! I was in Philadelphia and I can't even begin to tell you some of the Mickey Mouseing that went on there. I was there for 3.5 years and I left for the reasons mentioned above. Basically, I just got feed up, and left back in 2000. Basically, I had enough. This c-ap has been going on WAAAAAY to long, and the Government (Civilian & Military) need to do something about it! It's time for the Old School Management, Manufacturing and Engineering know how to make it's way back; it's that simple.
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DumbFսckery DipSҺitery SҺit SҺit Ch-ry – Boeing’s rank & file
Are as dumb as management indeed
Living back in 2003, under a rock sսcking their Շock
Boeing Will Pay High Price For McNerney's Mistake Of Treating Aviation Like It Was Any Other Industry
Richard Aboulafia Contributor
Aerospace & Defense
I cover aircraft markets, industry dynamics and strategies.
Jim McNerney, the outgoing chief executive officer of Boeing (Simon Dawson/Bloomberg)
Jim McNerney, the outgoing chief executive officer of Boeing (Simon Dawson/Bloomberg)
Yesterday’s announcement that Jim McNerney was retiring as Boeing CEO wasn’t a major surprise – everyone knew he’d leave within a year or so – but it was rather abrupt and the timing was unexpected. He probably jumped, but there are certainly reasons to believe that he may have been nudged along in his move.
Under McNerney, Boeing’s stock price did very well. Cash flow was generally strong, and investors like short-term metrics like these. But he also leaves behind a toxic legacy that future leadership will need to deal with.
The company continues to lose tens of millions of dollars on each 787 it builds. These recurring production losses (on top of 787 development costs) stood at over $26 billion in January and will likely reach $30 billion, and possibly beyond.
Boeing is using a 1,300 aircraft accounting block for the 787. Let’s assume that 1,000 future 787s will bear this burden (that is, let’s assume the company starts breaking even on each jet it builds just after it delivers its 300th Dreamliner). That means a $30 million tax on each of these 1,000 planes, in order to break even on the program.
This terrible drag on profitability would have been partly avoided if Boeing management had taken a different approach to labor. Rather than the McNerney formula of eliminating pensions, cutting wages, and shifting production to new facilities, the company could have proposed a partnership with their workers. After all, productivity improvements often come from the shop floor. That means getting the people who build aircraft to figure out ways to reduce sc-ap, improve work flow, and eliminate defects.
To encourage the process improvements that happen in a factory, a workforce should be incentivized with profit sharing or other compensation. At a minimum, machinists and engineers need to feel that their work is valued. Taking away pensions at a time of record sales is a terrible way to motivate workers to go the extra mile.
McNerney’s focus on the company’s stock price and cash flow at the expense of the long term wasn’t merely due to short-sightedness and greed. It was also likely due to a misunderstanding of how the aviation industry works. If a CEO comes from a different industry and doesn’t try to learn what makes aviation distinct, he’s likely to apply a one-size-fits-all template. For example, he might conclude that, as in many other industries, competition from China and other low cost manufacturers is creating tremendous cost pressures. McNerney’s previous CEO post was at 3M , a company that does face pressures from lower-cost producers. During tough labor negotiations, Boeing executives often cited competition from China as a rationale for their hard line on terms.
Yet aviation is not like other industries. There are certainly cost pressures, but this is a capital-intensive business with very high barriers to entry. Labor costs just don’t matter as much compared with other industries, and most producers and major subcontractors are domiciled in high cost countries.
China has been trying to enter the aircraft business for decades, with exactly zero signs of progress at the prime level (or even the major subcontractor level). Last year, China was the ninth largest supplier of aircraft components to the US, just behind Australia. Instead, this is an industry based on experience. This is why nobody, except Brazil’s Embraer , has successfully entered this business since World War Two.
An experienced and motivated workforce, therefore, is the most important asset a company has. McNerney failed to recognize this important fact, and the company has suffered as a result.
Dennis Muilenberg, the incoming CEO, is an aerospace industry veteran and a respected engineer. He needs to learn the unique dynamics of the commercial side of the business, but given his very strong industry background he should be able to make Boeing a better company. But he will also need to cope with that $30 billion 787 deferred costs overhang and a Boeing jetliner labor-management relationship that’s worse than anywhere else in the aerospace industry.
https://www.seattlepi.com/business/article/Boeing-CEO-Phil-Condit-resigns-1131020.php
They are all corrupt. Phil was in on Boeing merging with McDonald Douglas.
Jim McErney is the Worst CEO in the history of the company in my opinion. how most of his cronies are still executives at Boeing Should tell people the company has a long ways to go before it writes itself.
Instead of having cash reserves he spent millions of dollars on buying Boeing stock when it was at an all time high just to pay himself millions in bonuses. when the pandemic hit Boeing had a few cash reserves and Boeing stock was worth about a quarter of what it was when he spent millions on stock buybacks. He was more like a corporate raider than a CEO.
The Boeing 737 max which is the program he approved and which he would not do a new airplane replacement but pushed to do another version of the 737 which now everyone knows was a huge mistake this was his doing. That decision alone makes him worst CEO in history
But the same people who were Vice President and on the board during his tenure, Are still vying to run the company. It’s an insult.
Source
https://leehamnews.com/2019/10/07/pontifications-muilenburgs-departure-wouldnt-go-far-enough/
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Boeing Shareholders are nothing more than pockets to be picked
The BoD want Shareholders to believe they care
Nothing could be further from the truth
That’s what happens when all you care about is profit and shareholders