World's largest oil reserves are for grabs. Any bets on Exxon?
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Either learn how to spell or check your work.
It didn't work in Iraq, I doubt it will work in Venezuela. Trump shooting his mouth off again. Dear God, make it stop please.
@vm And likely culminating in lower PPB, reduced profit margins, and ultimately job cuts in the most expensive labor markets (read: EMHC).
Still happy about it?
US reaches deal to take up to $2 billion of Venezuelan oil
The United States and Venezuela have reached an agreement to export up to $2 billion worth of Venezuelan crude to U.S. ports, President Donald Trump said on Tuesday (January 6), a move that could redirect oil shipments meant for China and ease pressure on Venezuela’s sanctioned oil industry.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/us-reaches-deal-to-take-up-to-2-billion-of-venezuelan-oil/vi-AA1TJtVd?ocid=msedgntp&pc=EDGEDB&cvid=695ec3d0123646e3b4c5757812bcdd58&ei=9
@tc , sarcastic, eh!
@jb that's about what it amounts to.
@jb It’ll take five years just to get the machinery required for extraction and processing into the country and commissioned. Probably another decade to pay down the logistical costs.
Iraq is a good comparison to what we can expect here, only unlike Iraq, Venezuela is huge, covered in jungle & mountains, and has well-equipped armed forces experienced in guerrilla warfare.
And now, we are stealing oil!
@OP do you mean star alongside other O&G majors, or are you unable to spell?
Venezuela owes Exxon billions of dollars. That’s good news for us.
I only wish Rex Tillerson were still here. 🇺🇸🛢️👇
🔗 https://www.foxnews.com/politics/venezuela-still-owes-us-energy-companies-billions-trump-calls-new-investment �
@d1 The net impact would be a lower PPB.
Venezuelan product had already been largely sanctioned out of the global market, so the recent military action won’t lead to an increase in PPB anyway.
Venezuelan extraction/process facilities are in a dismal state. It would take years of work and billions of dollars to bring them up to profitable production levels. Any companies doing this work are also likely to be dealing with a widespread insurgency. Protecting facilities against this will be a huge added cost.
This will not lead to any U.S. job creation. It will not protect your job from being outsourced. It will not benefit you financially in any way.
What impact would more Venezuela volumes have on Permian production?
The oil sector’s biggest winners and losers from Venezuela regime change
Story by Laura Sanicola
The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has reopened a question the oil market has largely sidelined for years: What changes if Venezuela’s oil industry begins to normalize under U.S. influence?
In comments today, President Donald Trump says the sanctions on Venezuelan oil remain in place, but he also said that the U.S. intends to be “very involved” in Venezuela’s oil sector, which he says requires billions of dollars fix the “badly broken” oil infrastructure.
The administration frames this as a reclamation project, suggesting companies will be ‘reimbursed’ through direct access to the crude.
While Venezuela currently produces just 1% of global supply, the Wood Mackenzie estimate of $15–20 billion to add 500,000 barrels per day highlights the capital intensity of its extra-heavy crude. However, in the context of global energy, this could be a bargain: it is roughly 25% cheaper per barrel of capacity than current deepwater projects in Guyana or Brazil as a rehabilitation of existing fields rather than a new discovery.
Whatever happens, the process will be lengthy. Near term, oil prices will continue to be driven by OPEC+ policy, Russian exports, and global demand, not changes in Caracas.
Where the impact could show up first is downstream, the industry term for companies that process oil.
Near-Term Winners: U.S. Coastal Refiners
The most immediate beneficiaries of a U.S.-aligned Venezuela would be U.S. Gulf Coast refiners. Venezuelan crude is heavy and sulfur-rich—the exact grade many Gulf Coast refineries were built to process. Sanctions on Venezuela and Russia forced refiners to replace heavy barrels with costlier or less optimal alternatives, tightening margins at times.
Even modest, reliable Venezuelan flows would improve feedstock flexibility and economics for refiners that are configured to run heavy sour crude, which they can buy at a discount.
Venezuelan crude flowed to just a handful of U.S. refiners in October, totaling roughly 4.2 million barrels for the month, according to the latest EIA import data available. Valero took the largest share at about 1.6 million barrels, followed by Paulsboro Refining (PBF Energy) at 1.2 million barrels, Chevron at 1.0 million barrels, and Phillips 66 at roughly 0.5 million barrels.
Put in context, those volumes are small relative to what the same refiners already source from alternative heavy-crude suppliers. In October alone, Valero imported nearly five million barrels from Mexico, more than two million barrels from Colombia, and additional heavy barrels from Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina. Chevron’s Gulf Coast and West Coast system leaned heavily on Guyana, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Canada, with Guyanese crude exceeding Venezuelan volumes several times over.
Refiners don’t need Venezuela to reclaim its former role as a major global supplier to see economic upside. Even incremental, reliable Venezuelan barrels—bankable, insurable, and tradable—would widen the menu of heavy sour options available to complex refiners and improve feedstock economics at the margin.
Long Term Losers: Heavy Canadian Crude Producers
The most interesting competitive dynamic sits further out in time, and it intersects with Canada’s own efforts to reduce its dependence on the U.S. oil market.
That is where a normalization of Venezuelan crude exports under U.S. influence becomes relevant. Venezuelan crude competes most directly with Canadian oil sands barrels on quality, refinery fit, and end market. Both are heavy, high-sulfur crudes purchased primarily by complex U.S. refiners with coking capacity. Even modest, sustained Venezuelan exports would reintroduce competition into a segment of the market where Canada has enjoyed unusually favorable positioning.
Venezuela’s long absence from Western markets helped entrench Canadian heavy crude as the dominant supplier to U.S. refineries configured for heavy barrels. Canada currently exports about 3.3 million barrels a day of crude to the U.S., and Canadian oil accounts for roughly a quarter of U.S. refinery throughput. Much of that volume is heavy oil sands crude flowing primarily to the U.S. Midwest and Gulf Coast, where refineries were originally built to process Venezuelan and Mexican heavy grades.
That dependence on the U.S. has long been viewed in Ottawa as a strategic vulnerability. Successive Canadian governments have sought to diversify export routes and end markets. Under former central banker Mark Carney’s influence on Canadian economic policy, the emphasis has been less on expanding production at any cost and more on improving market access, pricing resilience, and long-term competitiveness.
Progress has been slow and uneven. The Trans Mountain expansion, which began operating last year, is the most tangible step so far, giving Canadian oil a clearer path to overseas buyers in Asia. Along with smaller improvements to pipelines and rail, it has helped Canadian producers get better prices by reducing congestion. They have also benefited from a shortage of heavy crude globally, as sanctions kept oil from countries like Venezuela, Iran, and at times Russia largely out of Western markets.
But deeper diversification remains a long way off. Ambitious ideas such as a true east-west pipeline linking Alberta crude to Atlantic tidewater remain politically and commercially challenging and are unlikely to materialize this decade. Rail exports can provide marginal flexibility but are costlier and less reliable. For now, the U.S. remains the overwhelmingly dominant destination for Canadian oil sands production.
This creates long-dated narrative risk for U.S.-listed Canadian producers such as Suncor, Cenovus Energy, Canadian Natural Resources, and Imperial Oil. Venezuelan barrels would not displace Canadian supply overnight, nor is this a 2026 earnings issue. But over time, renewed competition could cap upside to heavy-crude differentials, eroding the scarcity premium that has supported oil sands margins just as Canada is still struggling to meaningfully diversify away from the U.S. market.
U.S. shale producers are largely insulated. Their output is predominantly light crude, which isn’t a substitute for Venezuelan heavy oil. Their economics hinge on drilling productivity, costs, and oil prices—not competition from heavy barrels.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/the-oil-sector-s-biggest-winners-and-losers-from-venezuela-regime-change
Refining margins…yawn
XOM can make a huge margin with just refining upgrade with its 3 gulf coast refineries and ability to ship heavy crude up Mississippi river to Joliet. It will take time to wait on new govt, new regulations and rule of law. No one to negotiate with.. so upstream operations will not occur till nationalized assets are restored and compensation paid. XOM could waive compensation for Deepwater leases or more Orinoco. CVX will not have this arbitration advantage and has much smaller Gulf coast refining footprint, so their presence is not much advantage. Shell, Total and BP are clearly at disadvantage. COP gets money or assets back but they have no refining uplift. Plus XOM Guyana assets are no longer threatened. XOM is the big winner. Thank you DJT making MXOMGA
Chevron is far better positioned inside Venezuela
We’ll have to see how the prolonged, bloody, and very expensive insurgency that is likely to follow plays out.
This already didn’t work in Iraq, and it definitely won’t work in Venezuela. I really don’t think the people cheering this on fully understand what they’re buying-off.