How much of a loss was Tower in this regard? Because I think one of the things that was attractive to me about that acquisition was bringing in leadership that was used to being a Foundry, and even if they were more focused on the analog side of things, it was more about the mindset and mentality. Part of the reason for skepticism about Intel being a Foundry is the culture, it used to be a “Our way or the highway”, but now you have to have a different approach. Is that something that — obviously China never approved it, it is what it is — but is that something that you do look back on with regret?
PG: Yeah, I do. Obviously I thought that was going to be a good opportunity for us to bring thousands of people into the company who’ve been doing that and can start running up against the Intel Way, if you would, and helping us to transform more rapidly, that was part of the reason I wanted to do the acquisition. Obviously the whole US/China dynamic was something I underestimated when I started that.
Yeah, to me this has been the leading example of how Chinese retaliation.
PG: And hey, we were just caught in purgatory as I call it, and disappointing. Obviously we found a silver lining to that since we’re now bringing Tower into the New Mexico facility and we took the breakup fee and we turned it into a prepay and building that manufacturing line, so I’m still getting some benefit for it, but boy —
Not the cultural benefit to the extent you might have.
PG: Yeah, exactly. So I just misjudged that scenario.
That said, over the period of time, the 18 months since we began that acquisition we’ve hired a lot of people with Foundry expertise and we’ve really built up our customer team, our EDA (electronic design automation) enablement team, our PDA standardization team, and obviously there’s good news—