I've been with VMware for more than 20 years. Paul Maritz did well, but he didn't see the threat from AWS, famously thinking a bookseller couldn't compete. Pat, however, realized AWS was investing more than VMware's entire revenue annually to build its cloud infrastructure. Acquisitions like Nicira in 2012 contributed to growth, turning into a billion-dollar business in NSX. VMware entered the telco space with NFV when the market was ready. The Velocloud acquisition wasn't handled perfectly, but it expanded into new areas. Not all moves succeeded, but the goal was to keep VMware competitive and valuable to customers.
Moving away from vCloud Air allowed VMware to focus on its 4,000 global partners, selling VMware-based workloads. Pat wasn't flawless, but he sustained growth despite challenges. The low stock price was due to debt, more tied to owners than the CEO. Pat grew VMware's product base amid a changing competitive landscape. Consider how much further VMware could have gone if the $22.5 billion paid to Dell/shareholders from 2018 to 2021 had been used for growth. Financial engineering, using VMware like an ATM, is the core problem. The company should have been spun off earlier, but now it's driven by returns. Dell/Silverlake want another $40 billion from the VMware-Broadcom merger, extracting all capital used to buy EMC and VMware. So the entire transaction would be paid for by VMware giving them EMC for free. This is the mischief hurting the firm. Does VMware need to trim some fat? Yes. However, the core problem is the firm being caught up in this leveraged buyout nonsense.